Previous Entry Share Next Entry
Memorandum to the CIA: 26 AUGUST 1991. Голіцин був правий: от вже й Путін вказує НАТО шо робити
xyu
Memorandum to the CIA: 26 AUGUST 1991, Anatoliy Golitsyn
....
If the Soviets were truly moving towards genuine democracy, and were intent on a true 'Break with the Past', these symbolic changes would be accompanied by the introduction and implementation of a de-communization program, the irrevocable (not cosmetic) prohibition of the Communist Party and Komsomol organizations at all levels throughout the USSR, and the removal of 'former' Party and Komsomol members from all the main seats of power including the KGB, the Soviet army and its political commissar administration, the Ministries, especially those for the Interior and Foreign Affairs

To carry conviction, the necessary purge of former Communists would have to be carried out at all levels, as was the intention with the de-nazification program in Germany after the war. Without any such program, present changes, however impressive, will remain cosmetic.
...

'This time the KGB are going to finish with capitalist America once and for all'. I believed them then, and I believe that what is happening now is a bad omen for Western democracy.

http://www.spiritoftruth.org/coup.htm



Memorandum to the CIA: 26 AUGUST 1991

Anatoliy Golitsyn

THE AUTHOR'S ANALYSIS OF THE OBJECTIVES OF THE CALCULATED SOVIET 'COUP' AND OF ITS CALCULATED 'FAILURE'

According to my assessment, the Soviet 'coup' and its 'failure' constituted a grandiose display of deception - a provocation. The 'ineptitude' of the participants in the 'coup' and the 'failure' of it were skillfully planned and executed. The main argument in support of this assessment is that the Soviet military, the KGB, the Party and leading media figures apparently had neither the skill to launch a successful coup nor the guts to crush resistance to it. This is news indeed!

Facing a real crisis in Hungary in 1956, the same forces displayed exceptional skill, know-how and determination in crushing a genuine revolt. Knowledge of the Soviet mentality and of Moscow's record of ruthless action has convinced this analyst that the Soviet military, the Party and the leaders of the media all have the skill, the will and the courage to crush genuine resistance and opposition. They did not display them on this occasion because the abortive 'coup' was carried out in accordance with Party instructions; and it was the Party and the Komsomol themselves which organized the alleged resistance to it.

The real participants both in the 'coup' and in the 'failure' were some 20,000 or more chosen Komsomol and Party members in Moscow with two or three tank divisions guided by their political commissars and a handful of dedicated Party officials and generals who sacrificed their prestige in the interests of the Party's strategy and under the guidance of its strategists. The calculated nature of the 'coup' and its timing show that it was staged by the Russian, President Yeltsin, to save the essence of the Union at the time of transition to a new form of federation.

The abortive 'coup' and the 'resistance' to it were carefully calculated displays intended primarily for the West. This explains why Western media contacts with Moscow were not curtailed. On the contrary, the big guns of the Soviet media like Vitaliy Korotich and representatives of the Arbatov Institute were on hand both in Moscow and in the United States to 'help' the Western media with their interpretation of developments in the USSR. The episode shows how well Soviet strategists like Arbatov and his experts on the American media have mastered the art of projecting such displays for consumption by the American media, and throughout the West.

The Soviet strategists sought to underline for the West the dramatic ineptitude of the 'coup' and the spectacular courage and resistance displayed by the new 'Russian democrats' and their leader Yeltsin in 'defending' the Soviet Parliament- their symbolic equivalent of 'The White House'. The main external objective of the display was to demonstrate to the West that Soviet democratization is genuine, that it has the support of the people and that it is working. They want to convince the West that Western investment in the USSR will pay dividends.

They expect that the West will now respond with a new Marshall Plan which will bring Western technology flooding in to the Soviet Union, promoting joint ventures and stimulating a restructuring of the Soviet economy along the lines of the revival of the German and Japanese economies after the Second World War.

Internally, one objective is to influence the Soviet population towards acceptance of the new Party-controlled 'democracy' as a real power and to develop the strength and maturity of the new 'democratic' structure and the popularity of its leaders, especially Yeltsin. Another objective is to exploit this staged 'coup' in order to reorganize and 'reform' the Soviet bureaucracy, the military, the intelligence and counter-intelligence organizations and the diplomatic service, and to give them a new 'democratic' image.

The Soviet strategists realize that only with such a new image, implying a 'Break with the Past' and severance from Communism, can these organizations be converted into effective weapons for convergence with their counterparts in the United States. A further internal objective is to emphasize the change in the system by means of the spectacular, televised but calculated removal of old Communist symbols like the monuments to Lenin and Dzerzhinskiy, and the red banners.

These changes do not represent a genuine and sincere repudiation of Soviet design and intentions to secure an eventual world victory. Although very spectacular, the changes are cosmetic. They demonstrate only that Arbatov and others know how to manipulate the American and other Western media through the use of powerful symbols such as the dismantling of the Berlin Wall, the toppling of Lenin and Dzerzhinskiy statues and Yeltsin's staged 'defense' of the Soviet 'White House'.

If the Soviets were truly moving towards genuine democracy, and were intent on a true 'Break with the Past', these symbolic changes would be accompanied by the introduction and implementation of a de-communization program, the irrevocable (not cosmetic) prohibition of the Communist Party and Komsomol organizations at all levels throughout the USSR, and the removal of 'former' Party and Komsomol members from all the main seats of power including the KGB, the Soviet army and its political commissar administration, the Ministries, especially those for the Interior and Foreign Affairs, and the trade unions.

Yeltsin has allegedly banned the Communist Party in Russia. But the question should be asked: Why did he forget to ban the Komsomol youth organization?' [Note: According to 'The New York Times' of 29 September 1991, the Komsomol voted to dissolve itself; its regulations were changed 'to allow subordinate youth leagues in the Soviet Republics to succeed it' - Author's emphasis].

To carry conviction, the necessary purge of former Communists would have to be carried out at all levels, as was the intention with the de-nazification program in Germany after the war. Without any such program, present changes, however impressive, will remain cosmetic.

There are at present no means of distinguishing reliably between a genuine democrat and a former Communist in Russia. However one important criterion for judging the sincerity of the abrupt and virtually simultaneous conversion of former Communist leaders into true democrats would be a frank official statement from them that the Soviet Party and Government adopted a long-range strategy in the years 1958 to 1960, that 'Perestroika' is the advanced phase of this strategy, and that it is to be abandoned forthwith in favor of normal, open, civilized relations. There has been no sign whatsoever of any such admission.

Further criteria for judging the sincerity of the abrupt conversion of 'former' Communist leaders into believers in true democracy would need to include:

Accept the new Party-controlled 'democracy' as a real power and develop the strength and maturity of the new 'democratic' structure and the popularity of its leaders, especially Yeltsin. Another objective is to exploit this staged 'coup' in order to reorganize and 'reform' the Soviet bureaucracy, the military, the intelligence and counter-intelligence organizations and the diplomatic service, and to give them a new 'democratic' image.

The Soviet strategists realize that only with such a new image, implying a 'Break with the Past' and severance from Communism, can these organizations be converted into effective weapons for convergence with their counterparts in the United States. A further internal objective is to emphasize the change in the system by means of the spectacular, televised but calculated removal of old Communist symbols like the monuments to Lenin and Dzerzhinskiy, and the red banners.

These changes do not represent a genuine and sincere repudiation of Soviet design and intentions to secure an eventual world victory. Although very spectacular, the changes are cosmetic. They demonstrate only that Arbatov and others know how to manipulate the American and other Western media through the use of powerful symbols such as the dismantling of the Berlin Wall, the toppling of Lenin and Dzerzhinskiy statues and Yeltsin's staged 'defense' of the Soviet 'White House'.

If the Soviets were truly moving towards genuine democracy, and were intent on a true 'Break with the Past', these symbolic changes would be accompanied by the introduction and implementation of a de-communization program, the irrevocable (not cosmetic) prohibition of the Communist Party and Komsomol organizations at all levels throughout the USSR, and the removal of 'former' Party and Komsomol members from all the main seats of power including the KGB, the Soviet army and its political commissar administration, the Ministries, especially those for the Interior and Foreign Affairs, and the trade unions.

Yeltsin has allegedly banned the Communist Party in Russia. But the question should be asked: Why did he forget to ban the Komsomol youth organization?'

[Note: According to 'The New York Times' of 29 September 1991, the Komsomol voted

to dissolve itself; its regulations were changed 'to allow subordinate youth leagues in the Soviet Republics to succeed it' - Author's emphasis].

To carry conviction, the necessary purge of former Communists would have to be carried out at all levels, as was the intention with the de-nazification program in Germany after the war. Without any such program, present

changes, however impressive, will remain cosmetic.

There are at present no means of distinguishing reliably between a genuine democrat and a former Communist in Russia. However one important criterion for judging the sincerity of the abrupt and virtually simultaneous conversion of former

Communist leaders into true democrats would be a frank official statement from them that the Soviet Party and Government adopted a long-range strategy in the years 1958 to 1960, that 'Perestroika' is the advanced phase of this strategy, and that it is to be abandoned forthwith in favor of normal, open, civilized relations. There has been no sign whatsoever of any such admission.

Further criteria for judging the sincerity of the abrupt conversion of 'former' Communist leaders into believers in true democracy would need to include:
An official admission that the 'dissident movement' and its leader, Sakharov, were serving the interests of that strategy under KGB control;
Public exposure of the main KGB agents among Soviet scientists, priests, writers and theater and movie personalities who have been playing an active role in the KGB-controlled political 'opposition' - especially those like the 'conservative' Kochetov and the 'liberal' Tvardovskiy who in the 1960s engaged in a Party- and KGB-controlled debate intended to convey the false impression that Soviet society was evolving towards democracy;
And finally: a categorical repudiation of any strategic intention on the part of the Soviets of working towards 'convergence' with the United States.

The self-evident absence of any of these criteria indicates that the symbolic changes mean no more than that the strategists had reached the conclusion that the old symbols had outlived their usefulness - at least, in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe - and had to be replaced by new, more attractive, popular symbols. Moreover these cosmetic changes are logical and were predicted earlier by this analyst. The Soviets realized that convergence with the United States cannot be achieved under the old compromised symbols like Lenin, Dzerzhinskiy and others associated in the Western mind with terror, repression, exile and bloodshed. Convergence requires the introduction of new, attractive, national and 'democratic' symbols conveying the impression that Soviet 'democracy' is approaching the Western model.

No doubt these cosmetic changes, the reorganization of the Soviet bureaucracy and the new, more enigmatic status of its leaders like Yeltsin will be seen by the West as a deepening of the process of Soviet 'reform', offering new opportunities for Western policy. But the West's main weakness remains unchanged: it cannot grasp the fact that it is facing an acceleration in the unfolding of Soviet convergence strategy which is intended to procure the subservience of the West to Moscow under an ultimate Communist World Government.

The Machiavellian boldness and imagination displayed by the Soviet strategists through their staged 'coup' and its preordained defeat are alarming. No doubt these maneuvers will be followed not only by faked suicides, but also by staged trials of the alleged leaders of the 'coup'. These leaders may well be sentenced to apparent prison terms. But in fact they will live in comfortable retirement in resort areas like the Crimea and the Caucasus. Russia is a big country and places can be found for them to hide.

The' coup' and its 'defeat' show that the Soviets will go to any lengths in pursuit of their convergence strategy. This reminds me of remarks by Vladimir Zhenikhov, the former KGB Rezident in Finland, and Aleksey Novikov, another KGB officer, at the time the strategy was adopted in 1961. Both of them had recently returned from home leave in Moscow. When I asked for the latest news from headquarters, both replied using different words but to the same effect: 'This time the KGB are going to finish with capitalist America once and for all'. I believed them then, and I believe that what is happening now is a bad omen for Western democracy.

The other alarming aspect of the situation is Western euphoria and the uncritical acceptance of present Soviet developments at their face value. This shows how easily the West can be taken in by staged Soviet spectacles, and how justified the strategists are in believing that their 'era of provocations' will produce the intended results. Furthermore, Western euphoria and naiveté serve only to encourage the Soviet strategists to stage new spectacles more convinced than ever that their strategic designs are realistic. .

?

Log in

No account? Create an account