Сергій Кабуд ( Кий ) (xyu) wrote,
Сергій Кабуд ( Кий )

George W. Bush’s remarkable perseverance, ANTHRAX and corrupted CIA careerists


If anyone is interested in a scholarly account of the Iraq terror threat and Bush’s decision to invade, it’s best to set aside Paul O’Neill’s unfortunate collaboration with Ron Suskind (as offered in The Price of Loyalty) and pick up Laurie Mylroie’s "Bush vs. The Beltway". Mylroie gives us a close-up account of State Department and CIA obstructionism. She explains the intelligence community’s institutional incapacity to “connect the dots, and she celebrates George W. Bush’s remarkable perseverance and common sense.

Of special interest, Mylroie documents the role that the media has played in maliciously distorting the facts surrounding the war against Saddam. By delaying its assessments, the CIA has refused to acknowledge the April 8, 2001 meeting that took place between 9/11 hijacker Mohammed Atta and Iraqi intelligence officer Khalil Ibrahim Samir al-Ani. In this and other instances, the liberal press has purposely twisted the record, relying on anonymous sources to debunk open sources. Instead of confirming the myth of administration dishonesty, Mylroie reveals the stonewalling of the CIA. It is the CIA that missed the al Qaeda-Iraq connection from the beginning, and media liberals do not want Bush justified.

Mylroie recounts evidence that the 9/11 hijackers were involved with anthrax, that the anthrax was probably from Iraqi sources, that the Iraqi official press dropped hints about 9/11 beforehand and more. Mylroie also offers testimony from defectors who heard Saddam’s plans for “revenge” against America in personal meetings. Mylroie gives us a catalogue of facts, testimony and suggestive evidence that al Qaeda was working with Saddam’s intelligence services before, during and after 9/11.

In light of Mylroie’s brilliant presentation, in light of the dishonest “60 Minutes” hit-piece against President Bush, a fair-minded person might say that truth has been buried under drama and emotional commitments have trumped honest analysis – in the press and within the intelligence community.

In closing I would like to relate a striking incident from Mylroie’s book. In December 1994 Mylroie briefed a group of intelligence officials, including two members of the CIA’s Counter Terrorism Center. These two officials had done very little homework, according to Mylroie. They were stumped by the problem of getting Ramzi Yousef’s fingerprints, for example (which Mylroie told them how to do). One of the two “sat silently through the presentation, staring at the ground. When I had finished,” wrote Mylroie, “he sniffed that he would have wanted ‘better information.’” She later learned that he had no prior familiarity with the documentation she presented. Too lazy to do the research himself, ignorant to the core, he turned up his nose for reasons that only a bureaucrat can understand. As Mylorie explained, “the CIA had become unshakably attached to this radically erroneous understanding of terrorist activity. Over many years the agency ignored, and even suppressed, substantial evidence regarding Iraq’s possible role in at least two major acts of terrorism against the United States…. This pattern of self-deception would have critical implications for the agency’s response to the attacks of September 11.”

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